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AbstrAct: hegel defines his logic as the science that thinks about thinking. But when we 
interpret that work as outlining what happens when we reason we are vulnerable to frege’s 
charge of psychologism. i use hegel’s tripartite distinction among understanding, dialectical and 
speculative reason as operations of pure thought to suggest how thinking can work with objective 
concepts. in the last analysis, however, our ability to move from the subjective contingency of 
representations and ideas to the pure concepts we think develops from mechanical memory, 
which separates sign from sense so that we can focus simply on the latter. By becoming aware of 
the connections that underlie our thinking processes we may be able to both move beyond the 
abstractions of symbolic logic and clarify what informal logicians call relevance.
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Metaphysical readings of hegel’s logic have always been popular. McTaggart, for 
example, claims that hegel’s logic analyzes what happens when categories are predicated 
of a subject. Because inconsistencies arise between such a thesis and its antithesis, the 
logic progresses until we have a fully consistent description of a subject. The logical 
moves through thesis and antithesis to synthesis do not describe reality as it actually 
is, but rather reflect the way finite and incomplete thought corrects its subjective and 
limited predications on the way to completeness.1
This perspective was taken further by Bradley. for him, the logic is designed to 
show how all the elements of thought are ultimately interconnected in ‘the absolute’. 
and we find similar claims in the commentaries of e.e. harris, charles Taylor and 
clark Butler.2
stephen houlgate takes another approach; he says that thought simply is being.3 i 
     1. John ellis McTaggart, A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic, cambridge, cambridge University Press, 1910.
     2. francis h. Bradley, The Principles of  Logic, london, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1883, clark Butler, 
Hegel’s Logic: Between Dialectic and History, evanston, northwestern University Press, 1997, errol e. harris, An 
Interpretation of  the Logic of  Hegel, lanham, University Press of america, 1983, charles Taylor, Hegel, cam-
bridge, cambridge University Press, 1975.
     3. stephen houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy: Freedom, Truth and History, 2nd ed., oxford, Black-
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find this statement puzzling, however. is he saying that any act of thinking must be? But 
then it is not clear why the determinations of thought apply to anything more than the 
thinking that is doing it. or is he saying that being, wherever and whenever it is found, 
is also pure thought? But that sounds almost as preposterous as the earlier talk about an 
entity called ‘the absolute’. 
in that phrase, the definite article suggests something singular and unique. But 
‘absolute’ started out as an adjective. as Kant points out, ‘absolute’ means two things: 
that which is isolated from any context that would relativize it—and that is certainly 
an unhelpful description of ultimate reality. or it is that which is valid in all respects.4 
Transforming the adjective—which basically means ‘that which is not relative’—into a 
noun seems misplaced. for if the absolute is valid in all respects, then we are ourselves 
somehow incorporated into its reality, and any claim that, from our finite, involved 
perspective, we can somehow grasp an objective and comprehensive description of all 
that is sounds like presumptuous hubris.
My second problem with the metaphysical approach lies in the way it justifies the 
necessity of the logical progression. The classical British idealists and their successors all 
suggest that the contradictions and antitheses that drive the logic forward are simply the 
results of our limited perspective. They are flaws within our natural ways of thinking. 
and our task is to somehow get beyond these limited perspectives to what is ultimately 
real. once we reach our goal, we can cast away the ladder that gets us there. But this 
implies that, were we to develop suitable intuitive capabilities, we could dispense with 
the logic altogether. The logic is simply a way we can therapeutically dispose of the 
impediments that clutter up our everyday existence.
in contrast, hegel seems to think that the various moments within the logic are 
significant for understanding the world around us. They are not simply aspects of the 
way we think, but also of the natural world and historical experience we encounter from 
day to day. The transition by which ‘something’ comes to the limit of its capabilities and 
converts into ‘something else’ is not just a function of our thinking, but also describes the 
world of finite things: of rocks and continents, of flowers and dinosaurs, of human beings 
and the canadian economy. 
on the other hand, for those who think that each of hegel’s categories describes 
some particular metaphysical reality or principle, one finds it difficult to see how one 
such principle could ever metamorphose into another one: how the principle that 
differentiates a substance from its accidents, for example, can be transformed into 
the principle that differentiates cause from effect. We have, after all, been nurtured 
within the philosophical heritage of Plato, where metaphysics describes the universal, 
non-temporal and so unchanging ideas that undergird and explain the changing 
phenomenal world of every-day. such metaphysical principles are in some sense eternal 
and unchanging.
well, 2005.
     4. immanuel Kant, Critique of  Pure Reason, trans. Paul guyer and allen Wood, new York, cambridge, 
1998, pp. a324-7/B80-3.
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let me summarize: when we read hegel’s Logic primarily as a kind of metaphysics, 
we come up with something that is not ultimately convincing. We either come up with 
a metaphysical entity that does not impinge on our normal experience, or we have to 
abandon any sense of a logically necessary progression. even more, it is hard to see what 
relevance such a reading can have for our everyday life—unless we think that we should 
immerse ourselves in a Buddha-like quest for enlightenment, or go around spouting an 
incomprehensible explanation of what the world is like, using obscure technical terms 
in the manner of alfred north Whitehead.
When i started digging into hegel’s logic, the first thing i encountered was his claim that 
the logic is thought thinking itself. This is found in Paragraph 19 of the Encyclopaedia: 
‘logic’, he writes, ‘is the science of  the pure idea; that is, the idea in the abstract element 
of thinking’. and he underlines ‘thinking’ in that last clause. While he does not want to 
justify his study of logic simply on the basis of its utility, he does allow that it has its uses. 
for in the accompanying remark he writes: ‘The usefulness of the logic is a matter of its 
relationship to the subject, insofar as one gives oneself a certain formation for other pur-
poses. The formation of the subject through logic consists in one becoming proficient 
in thinking (since this science is the thinking of thinking) and in one’s coming to have 
thoughts in one’s head and to know them also as thoughts’.5
To be sure he immediately goes on to say that the logic also explores truth in its 
purity, but he adds that usefulness is nonetheless a proper characteristic of whatever is 
most excellent, free and independent.
important to notice in my last citation is hegel’s aside that the science of logic is the 
‘thinking of thinking’.
similar expressions can be found in the larger Science of  Logic. in its introduction, 
hegel starts by noting that the logic must not only establish the proper scientific method, 
but must explore the very concept of what it means to be a science. its subject matter—
that which is to be its most essential content—is ‘thinking, or more precisely conceptual 
thinking’, and again he underlines the critical terms. later in the introduction, just before 
he says that the logic presents god as he is in his eternal nature before the creation of 
the world, he points out that ‘the logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, 
as the realm of pure thoughts’.
The most obvious way of reading all this is to assume that hegel is going to explore 
what goes on when we reason—we are going to think about what happens when we 
think. if he says at the same time that this is the description of god before the creation 
of the world, he can only mean that god is pure thought—and that whatever happens 
in our thinking in some way reproduces the inner life of god.
But there is a fly in the ointment. for thinking is never static. We clarify our 
thoughts and render them more precise and determinate; we find that some thoughts 
     5. g. W. f. hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (1830), with the Zusätze: Part I of  the Encyclopaedia of  Philosophical 
Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. Theodore f. geraets, W. a. suchting and h. s. harris, indianapolis, hackett, 
1991 (henceforth el).
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lead on to other thoughts through something we usually call inference or implication. 
if, instead of relying on simple nouns like ‘concepts’ or ‘thoughts’ to describe this reality, 
we adopt active gerunds like ‘conceiving’ or ‘thinking’, we immediately realize that we 
are immersed in a dynamic that moves and develops. concepts emerge out of that 
thinking and disappear back into it again. But this means that, when we talk about 
such processes, we become vulnerable to the charge of psychologism. if we are going to 
talk about thinking as an activity, we will be simply exploring the way human intellects 
happen to function.
indeed, that charge emerged quite quickly. in one of the first, most thorough, and 
most complimentary reviews of On Hegel’s Logic,6 published in the Owl of  Minerva,7 george 
di giovanni focused on the fact that, in an effort to clarify the distinction between 
representation and thought, i had relied on hegel’s discussion of Psychology in the 
Philosophy of  Spirit. Representations are based in intuitions, and are thus prey to the 
contingencies of personal experience. By deriving thinking from representing, i was 
in danger of removing from the logical discussion the necessity that follows from the 
inherent determinations or definitions of the concepts themselves. 
in my discussion of logical necessity, i had said, ‘The claim of absolute necessity 
for the logical analysis has not been justified in the preceding commentary. … The 
reader was invited to refer simply to his own intellectual operations’.8 and again, ‘We 
have defined pure thought relative to the psychological operations of intelligence; and 
these are known to us only in the context of the human species’.9 To these comments, di 
giovanni replies: ‘To the reader these disclaimers are suspect not because of what they 
say, but because they are made at all. either hegel’s logic has absolute validity qua logic, 
and this has already been established by reflection on its idea; or it is not logic at all. no 
middle position is possible. We are left with the suspicion, therefore, that Burbidge has 
been trying to validate hegel’s logic on psychological grounds; and to the extent that 
this was his intention, he cannot escape the charge of psychologism’.10 
Psychologism, as a fallacy threatening the objective necessity of logic, was first 
identified by gottlob frege. he drew the same distinction drawn by hegel: between 
Vorstellung and Begriff. Unfortunately that has been lost for his english readers, because 
his translators have translated Vorstellung with ‘idea’, not ‘representation’, following in 
the tradition established by locke and hume. ideas, for frege as for hegel, involve 
images or representations—mental pictures that stem from the idiosyncratic experience 
of the subject in whom they occur. Thus they provide no established common point 
of reference to which all people can appeal. ‘The idea (Vorstellung) is subjective’: writes 
     6. John W. Burbidge, On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of  a Commentary, atlantic highlands, humanities Press, 
1981.
     7. george di giovanni, ‘Burbidge and hegel on the logic: on hegel’s logic, fragments of a commen-
tary, by John Burbidge’, The Owl Minerva, vol. 14, no. 1, 1982, pp. 1-6.
     8. Burbidge, On Hegel’s Logic, p. 204.
     9. Burbidge, On Hegel’s Logic, p. 201.
     10. di giovanni, ‘Burbidge and hegel on the logic: on hegel’s logic, fragments of a commentary, by 
John Burbidge’, p. 4.
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frege, ‘one man’s idea is not that of another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety 
of differences in the ideas (Vorstellungen) associated with the same sense. a painter, a 
horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas (Vorstellungen) with the 
name ‘Bucephalus’. This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea (Vorstellung) 
and the sign’s sense, which may be the common property of many people, and so is not 
a part or mode of the individual mind’.11
for frege, the study of individual minds is psychology, and any attempt to derive 
logic from what minds do, in the manner of the British empiricists, is bedevilled by 
the contingencies of each person’s peculiar mental history. in contrast, concepts persist, 
are unaffected by particular experiences, and are common to whoever thinks them. 
in drawing that distinction, however, he placed concepts in an anomalous position. 
as graduate students back in the fifties, we were told that a critical question for the 
philosophy of logic was the ontological status of concepts and propositions. Do they 
exist in some kind of Platonic heaven, simply waiting to be grasped by some perceptive 
and disciplined thinker? if not, how do they maintain their inviolable character? 
for frege, because concepts are isolated from any contamination by the minds that 
think them, they persist unchanged and static. With that as his philosophical context, 
then, it is not surprising that inwood, in his massive, but seriously flawed, study of 
hegel’s arguments, insists that ‘concepts and their interrelationships are static in a way 
that our thinking is not’.12 it is no wonder that he can find nothing relevant in hegel’s 
logical discussions.
Yet, even as frege dismisses psychology, he continues to use psychological terms 
when talking about concepts. so there are indications, even in frege’s writing, that there 
may be more to be said about the dynamics of thinking than he allows. for concepts 
can be grasped.13 ‘The grasp of a thought’, he commented towards the end of his life, 
‘presupposes someone who grasps it, who thinks. he is the owner of the thinking, 
not of the thought. although the thought does not belong with the contents of the 
thinker’s consciousness, there must be something in his consciousness that is aimed at 
the thought’.14
Throughout The Foundations of  Arithmetic we find similar references to the intellectual 
dynamic involved in grasping a thought: ‘often it is only after immense intellectual 
effort, which may have continued over centuries, that humanity at last succeeds in 
achieving knowledge of a concept in its pure form, in stripping off the irrelevant accretions 
which veil it from the eye of the mind’. 
at one point frege suggests that this ability to grasp thoughts is improved when we 
are able to dissociate ourselves from the particular conditions of our native language, 
     11. gottlob frege, ‘on sinn and Bedeuting’, in Michael Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader, oxford, Blackwell, 
1997, pp. 151-71, p. 154.
     12. Michael J. inwood, Hegel, london, Routledge, 1983, p. 310.
     13. see frege’s letter to husserl: ‘Thoughts are not mental entities, and thinking is not the mental genera-
tion of such entities but the grasping of  thoughts which are already present objectively’ (my italics). Beaney 
(ed.), The Frege Reader, p. 302.
     14. see ‘Thought’ [75] in Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader, p. 342.
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with the associations and feelings that have become attached to them: ‘it is true that we 
can express the same thought in different languages; but the psychological trappings, 
the clothing of the thought, will often be different. This is why the learning of foreign 
languages is useful for one’s logical education. seeing that the same thought can be 
worded in different ways, we learn better to distinguish the verbal husk from the kernel with 
which, in any given language, it appears to be organically bound up. This is how the 
differences between languages can facilitate our grasp of what is logical’.15
however, frege’s distinction between our thinking and the thoughts themselves 
‘which are not mental entities’ seems to me to be problematic. consider what goes on in 
that process of ‘achieving knowledge of a concept in its pure form, … of stripping off the 
irrelevant accretions’, taking as our example the concept ‘infinity’. We start by thinking 
of that which, unlike the finite, has no limits. as beyond any such limit, the infinite can 
be thought of as a simple ‘beyond’. But that has its problems, because it is, to that extent, 
limited by the fact that it is other than the finite. and as limited, it is itself finite. so we 
start on a process of moving beyond each limit, only to find that we have only derived 
another limited thought. When we think back over this dynamic, we come up with a 
new sense of ‘infinite’ as that which is this process continually repeated. This is the sense 
we now associate with mathematical infinity—the fact that any process an be repeated 
endlessly.
You will have recognized that i have been describing hegel’s analysis of this concept.16 
he suggests that we use this concept of infinite regress not only for mathematics but for 
qualitative distinctions as well. Whenever any determinate quality comes to an end, the 
result is simply another determinate quality—and ‘infinite’ describes the progress or 
regress by which the dynamic continues on its way.
We now have two or three different definitions of ‘infinity’. The abstract ‘beyond’, 
the infinity of a recurring mathematical sequence, the infinity of a process where finite 
things disappear, but never into nothingness, but only into other finite things. Which of 
these is the pure concept that we are endeavouring to grasp? The logical mathematician 
would probably prefer the mathematical sequence. But notice that it has emerged only 
because our thinking has been led to move beyond any determinate number to the 
next. That thinking dynamic is implicit within our definition of the mathematical term. 
Thinking has become a component of the thought.
There may be other senses of ‘infinity’ as well. When we reflect back on the dynamic 
of an infinite progress or regress, we see that when we consider it as a whole, we have 
a process in which determinate finite moments are both generated and transcended. 
here we are not talking simply about a linear sequence, but a self-contained dynamic 
that both increases in complexity and at the same time maintains its comprehensive 
     15. ‘logic’ [154] in Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader, p. 343 (my italics). i was delighted when i discovered 
this passage, because it fitted with my own attempt to move beyond the relativity of cultures through an 
exploration of the way a knowledge of different languages moves us towards concepts. see On Hegel’s Logic, 
chapter 3.
     16. see Book 1, chapter 2, section c of g. W. f. hegel, Science of  Logic, trans. a.v. Miller, new Jersey, 
humanities Press, 1997.
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unity. here we have a quite different sense of ‘infinite’. But it, too, has resulted from our 
thinking about the earlier forms and contains the dynamic of that thinking implicit in 
its meaning. Thought and thinking are not as isolated as frege wants to assume. one 
concept merges into another.
in providing this illustration, i want to suggest that the minds which provide the 
subject matter of psychology do more than simply represent experiences in retained 
images or ideas, as the British empiricists have it. The intellect can reflect back over those 
experiences and extract similarities and common elements; it can distinguish some of 
those elements from others. in the course of doing so, it starts on a process of distancing 
itself from the contingent associations and experiences of our original intuitions and 
of moving toward common, persisting concepts. it is that process of distancing that 
hegel traces in his psychology. nonetheless, for all that reflective thought has removed 
contingencies when we come to pure thinking, the intellect is still active in generating 
thoughts. an intellectual dynamic remains. We have made no leap across a nasty broad 
ditch into some alien genus, some ethereal realm of pure concepts that we simply 
contemplate. But what we are now thinking has been refined and purified, freed from 
the contingencies of representation and idiosyncratic experience. in other words, hegel 
provides a naturalistic explanation for frege’s distinction between ideas and concepts
i must confess that, in On Hegel’s Logic, i did not show clearly how hegel wanted to 
distinguish the contingencies of representations or ideas from the necessity of concepts. 
and to this extent i was vulnerable to di giovanni’s attack. But it seemed to me, and it 
still seems to me, that we have to establish the context within which thought functions 
if we are to make any sense of hegel’s logic of concepts; and that means that we have to 
take seriously the dynamic that actual thinking involves.
hegel identifies three sides to that dynamic, which he calls understanding, dialectical 
reason and speculative reason. let me quickly remind you what these kinds of reasoning 
involve.
The task of understanding is to fix the determinations of a concept—to define it 
carefully and precisely, and isolate it from the flux of thinking. To do this we must 
distinguish it from all contingencies and keep its conceptual components separated from 
other related concepts.
But this has an interesting consequence. for, if we are to get the original concept 
precisely defined, we need to define as well these related terms—its contraries and its 
close synonyms—so that the various terms do not become confused. This involves two 
distinct operations. There is, first of all, distinguishing two contraries that sit within 
a more general concept or genus. Thus, when we think of the term ‘something’, we 
must also define the term ‘other’; when we understand ‘actual’ we must also be clear 
on ‘possible’, when we talk about ‘subjectivity’ we must be aware of what we mean by 
‘objectivity’.
But there are also close synonyms where we need to discern slightly distinct meanings. 
in ordinary conversation ‘being’, ‘existence’, ‘actual’, ‘real’, and ‘objective’ can frequently 
substitute for one another. But we find that each one has a subtle character of its own 
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that needs to be marked out precisely if we are to understand the concept (as opposed 
to our conventional associations) and get it right.
in much philosophical discourse, understanding a term involves abstracting it 
from its context, and then holding it fixed as an unchanging entity. it then subsists in 
some kind of static realm, and becomes the basis for frege’s and inwood’s permanent 
and unchanging concepts. But when we think about the actual process of thinking we 
are aware that understanding a term introduces a move on to other terms—to those 
contraries from which it is differentiated, and to those subtle determinations that 
distinguish it from its close synonyms. This is the process hegel calls dialectical reason: 
‘the dialectical moment is the peculiar or typical self-cancelling of these kinds of finite 
determinations and their passing over into their opposites’ (el § 80). Thought cannot 
stay fixed with its original isolated terms.
There are several important terms in that definition of dialectic. The first is the 
term ‘self-cancelling’. hegel is suggesting that when we focus on the original term in 
its precise definition we find that it requires our moving on to the contrary and other 
determinations. We do not introduce some casual consideration from outside because of 
our sense of where we want to go. The meanings inherent in the initial concept require 
that thought move over to an opposite, precisely because the determinations set a limit, 
and we can understand the limit only if we are clear about what is on the other side.
The second term is one omitted by both translations—by Wallace and the geraets 
team: The german modifies self-cancelling (Sichaufheben) with the adjective ‘eigene’—
which means ‘typical’, ‘strange’, ‘peculiar’, or ‘particular’. The self cancelling of dialectical 
thinking does not follow a preordained method or rule. it emerges from the peculiar 
nature of the concept being thought—from its specific and determinate sense. This is 
why there can be no discussion of method apart from a consideration of what happens 
when we actually think. We saw an example of this kind of dialectical move as we went 
from ‘finite’ to ‘the beyond’, and then from there on to ‘infinite regress’.
had we only understanding and dialectical reason, we would be left with nothing but 
a stream of thoughts, as we move on from thought to thought, each move determined by 
the specific sense of the preceding concept. But we can do more. We reflect back over what 
has happened and in a single thought consider both the original term and the opposites 
that result from its definition. in other words we bring them together and think them as 
a single thought—as a unity. This means that we can identify what particular senses and 
meanings bind them together. and we can incorporate those determinations into the 
characterization or definition of this new thought. ‘The speculative, or the positively rational 
grasps the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is contained 
in their dissolution and transitions’ (el § 82). This process of speculative reason is also 
a dynamic one, working from the original meanings and discovering implications and 
interconnections that integrate the variety of senses. (We saw this happening in the final 
sense of ‘infinity’ discussed before.) With this, we set the stage for understanding to start 
once again fixing the required definition. When understanding isolates that network 
of meaning, integrates it into a unity and establishes its precise meaning, it generates a 
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new concept.
it is worth recalling here a section of Kant’s Critique of  Pure Reason, particularly in the 
first edition. in both the clue to the categories, and their Transcendental Deduction, 
Kant distinguishes the syntheses of imagination from the unity introduced by the 
understanding.17 it is this unity which establishes the particular determinate character 
of a concept. Unlike Kant, hegel, in his Logic does not rely on imagination as the agent 
of synthesis. Rather it is reflection on the dialectical transition from one concept to 
its contrary—that peculiar self-cancelling—that brings together, or synthesizes, the 
various terms. But understanding a concept involves finding the grounds or reasons 
that underlie the conceptual synthesis. once again, the logic follows from the inherent 
character of the senses being discussed.
Two things need to be highlighted. in the first place, this whole movement follows 
from the inherent significance of the concepts being thought. it does not reflect anything 
brought in from the subjectivity of personal experience. This is the point di giovanni 
was making in his review.
But the second thing to notice is that it is a movement, a dynamic. Thought moves 
from the original concept to its opposite; thought brings together the two terms and 
integrates them into a unity, using the principle of sufficient reason, thus generating a 
new network of meanings. This dynamic is inherent in the very nature of reason itself. 
it is what constitutes the rationality of the logic, and by implication the rationality of the 
world itself.
how, then, is hegel, within his psychology, able to make the move from the 
contingencies of representation to this focusing on pure thought, while retaining the 
dynamic of intellectual activity? he does so through the working of memory, and in 
particular mechanical memory. The imagination has introduced signs. and signs refer 
to that which is common to, or relates, various representations. They have already taken 
us beyond the specifics of experience to the content that ideas share. even so, signs 
retain the contingency and arbitrariness of their initial formation. Memory begins to 
dilute this contingency, first by attaching a sign to the same content over and over again, 
so that they become melded to each other. The circumstances of its origin becomes 
irrelevant. Then, when we say things by heart, we string together a number of signs 
without paying any attention to their meaning. in this kind of mechanical memory, 
words simply come out one after another and we pay no attention to the meanings they 
represent. in other words, we say the words without thinking.
for hegel, however, this has a dialectical implication, for if we can string off signs 
without meaning, we can equally well consider meanings without signs. The process 
becomes inverted. it is this inversion that frees thought finally from the contingencies of 
representations and experience. for we can now focus on the content of those thoughts 
and determine them precisely without any reference to the circumstances under which 
they originated. it is this significance of mechanical memory that had eluded me in my 
early work, and thus justified di giovanni’s concern.
     17. Kant, Critique of  Pure Reason, a76-80/B102-5, a95-30.
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hegel’s development of a logic based on the dynamic of thinking, it seems to me, has 
much to say to contemporary discussions. 
nurtured on frege’s anti-psychologism, with its radical distinction between pure, 
static concepts and the contingencies of the mind’s ideas or representations, modern 
symbolic logic works only with forms, assuming that concepts can be plugged into the 
various slots without distortion and without residue. as a result it has moved further 
and further from the kind of reasoning by which people govern their lives, leaving in its 
wake freedom for contingent associations to react to, and feed on, rhetoric and emotion. 
formal logic has no tools with which it can criticize or assess the natural inferences 
people make every day, no way of distinguishing when an implication is grounded in 
the sense being thought, and when it brings in irrelevant considerations. it can identify 
a modus ponens or a Barbara syllogism; but it cannot distinguish between a syllogism 
which picks up thoughts only contingently related, and those where meanings are 
connected through a structure of implication. (‘implication’, after all, means drawing out 
what is implicit.) Within its own sphere, symbolic logic has proven to be a powerful tool 
for developing a calculus; but by claiming to define exhaustively everything involved in 
logic proper, it has abandoned any role in governing the way we human beings actualize 
our rational natures. ironically, by abandoning the dynamic of concrete reasoning, logic 
has left the field open for post-modernist deconstruction.
The study of informal logic has moved into that vacancy, and attempted to develop 
strategies for improving the way people reason. But the most critical criteria for assessing 
normal reasoning is that of relevance, and informal logicians have found it difficult, if 
not impossible, to identify what it means for one thought to be relevant to another. By 
staying within the traditional understanding of concepts as fixed entities, they can only 
show connections by bringing in contingent and psychological associations, following 
the practice of the British empiricists, or refer to the expectations of the audience. an 
hegelian interest in exploring the dynamic movement inherent in thought could well 
illuminate what it means to be relevant.
so there is much that hegel’s Logic could say to the world of contemporary philosophy. 
Were we to return to his large three volumed work, we would find hidden in its obscure 
prose a number of insights into those relationships among concepts that hinge on their 
objective significance. even if many of them were to prove conditional, dependent on 
a particular culture or a particular age, the approach he takes may provide a useful 
guide for exploring the connections between thoughts in our own culture and our own 
age. This becomes possible as we stress the role of thought and thinking as providing 
the foundation of the logic, and reduce its metaphysical claims to a secondary role. it 
is because thought requires that we move as we do from concept to concept that the 
logic builds up its edifice. The fact that this edifice of pure reason captures the core 
significance of nature and history, revealing their inherent rationality, suggests that our 
thinking and its dynamic, working within its own inherent necessity, has the capacity 
of grasping the nature of things. But we need to make sure that we get the horse before 
the cart. if we do want to draw metaphysical conclusions, we need to start by thinking 
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simply about the nature of pure thought. for it is that logical dynamic, says hegel, that 
describes god’s nature as he is before the creation of nature and finite spirits.
John W. Burbidge 
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